We consider whether pollution-intensive FDI tends to outflow from a country which maintains stringent environmental regulations and into countries with weak environmental regulations.
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Non-Technical Summary
The pollution haven hypothesis states that the production of pollution intensive goods will migrate from countries in which environmental standards are high to those in which they are low.
Providing robust empirical support for the pollution haven hypothesis has proved difficult. Focusing on FDI flows, the empirical evidence which looks at U.S. inward FDI and differences in pollution abatement among U.S. states has arguably had most success in establishing an effect. Studies which consider the relocation patterns of plants within the U.S. are also in favour of a statistically significant role for environmental regulations. For non-U.S. countries, the support for the pollution haven hypothesis has been more mixed.
Within the pollution haven literature less attention has been paid to the question of whether pollutionintensive FDI tends to outflow from a country which maintains stringent environmental regulations and into countries with weak environmental regulations (typically developing countries). The limited evidence suggests that environmental standards are only a minor consideration in investment decisions.
In this paper we add to this literature by incorporating the predictions from the recent heterogeneous firm models of international trade into our empirical model of outward FDI by UK firms. As these models make clear, differences in the underlying characteristics of firms mean that even when faced with the same set of choices about global engagement, only the best firms in the industry are sufficiently productive to cover the sunk costs associated with FDI. In addition to the standard industry level measures of environmental regulation it is therefore important to control for firm characteristics in the modelling of outward FDI. We also study the choice about which locations to host that production. If the sunk costs of becoming a multinational differ across countries and the weakest environmental regulations are in countries with the highest entry costs, then only a small fraction of multinational firms will able to take advantage of these differences in environment regulation. If potential pollution havens instead have lower entry costs, in comparison the pollution haven effect will encourage a greater proportion of multinationals to locate production there.
We test whether there is a significant pollution haven effect for the UK because it is subject to relatively stringent environmental regulations which are strongly enforced, whilst also being one of the largest outward investors of the world economy.
Introduction
The pollution haven hypothesis states that the production of pollution intensive goods will migrate from countries in which environmental standards are high to those in which they are low. Given the strong correlation between environmental regulation and per capita income, for some this has the additional connotation that developed countries use developing countries as the location of pollution intensive production.
The early theoretical literature captures the idea of pollution havens as di¤erences in the comparative advantage of countries in the production of pollution intensive goods (Pethig (1976) , Siebert (1977) and Yohe (1979) ). Copeland and Taylor (1994) extend the analysis by endogenising environmental policy such that it depends upon national income. In these models of environmental regulations and trade, a country's comparative advantage in pollution-intensive industries is weakened by strict environmental regulation, thereby reducing its net exports from such sectors. On the other-hand, those countries which do not maintain high environmental standards increase their specialisation in pollution-intensive industries. Models have also been developed to show that similar results hold for capital ‡ows (McGuire (1982) ). If any factor of production is freely mobile across frontiers, environmental regulation will drive out the regulated industry from the more to the less regulated economy. More recently, however, Eskeland and Harrison (2003) show that the e¤ect of environmental regulation imposed at home on outward investment may be ambiguous due to a possible complementarity between capital and pollution abatement.
In comparison to the theoretical modelling of the pollution haven hypothesis, providing robust empirical support has proved more di¢ cult. Focusing on FDI ‡ows, the empirical evidence which looks at U.S. inward FDI and di¤erences in pollution abatement among U.S. states has arguably had most success in establishing an e¤ect. List and Co (2000) and Keller and Levinson (2002) both …nd evidence that increased environmental regulation is associated with lower FDI in ‡ows into U.S. states. Typically, it is argued that this approach has the advantage that while environmental regulations are known to di¤er across states, other di¢ cult to measure country and industry di¤erences that matter for FDI do not, or at least di¤er relatively little (Keller and Levinson, 2002) . 1 For non-U.S. countries, Waldkirch Within the pollution haven literature rather less attention has been paid to the question of whether pollution-intensive FDI tends to out ‡ow from a country which maintains stringent environmental regulations and into countries with weak environmental regulations, including developing countries. Early studies for the U.S. include Duerksen and Leonard (1980) , who examine both trade and investment data in an e¤ort to uncover a pollution haven e¤ect. They …nd that U.S. FDI in pollution-intensive industries has not increased signi…cantly in developing countries relative to developed countries. Overall, they argue that environmental standards are only a minor consideration in investment decisions. Similar results are obtained by Walter (1982) in a study of FDI by …rms located in the U.S., Europe and Japan for the period 1970 to 1978. Finally, Xing and Kolstad (2002) …nd some evidence for outward FDI from heavily polluting U.S. industries (chemicals and primary metals).
In this paper we add to this literature by incorporating the predictions from the recent heterogeneous …rm models of international trade, pioneered amongst others by Melitz (2003) and Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) , into our empirical model of outward FDI by UK …rms. As these models make clear, di¤erences in the underlying characteristics of …rms, captured in theory as productivity di¤erences, mean that even when faced with the same set of choices about global engagement, which presumably will include the incentives to avoid environmental regulation in the home market, only the best …rms in the industry are su¢ ciently productive to cover the sunk costs associated with FDI. Empirically signi…cant role for environmental regulations.
2 this suggests that in addition to the standard industry level measures of environmental regulation it is therefore important to control for …rm characteristics in the modelling of outward FDI and that changes in environmental regulation may only a¤ect the choices of a relatively small number of …rms. We also study a second extensive margin to outward FDI; the choice about which locations to host that production.
If the sunk costs of becoming a multinational di¤er across countries and the weakest environmental regulations are in countries that are culturally and physically distant, i.e. those with the highest entry costs, then only a small fraction of multinational …rms will able to take advantage of these di¤erences in environment regulation. If potential pollution havens instead have greater proximity to the home country and therefore lower entry costs, in comparison the pollution haven e¤ect will encourage a greater proportion of multinationals to locate production there. Across these two questions we therefore focus on the 'who'and the 'where'components of the pollution haven hypothesis.
In terms of the empirical methodology the paper is closest to that of Yeaple (forthcoming) who examines the location choices of U.S. multinationals, while from the environmental literature only Smarzynska and Wei (2004) have modelled the pollution haven hypothesis in this way. To the best of our knowledge, no previous studies have considered whether there is a pollution haven e¤ect from environmental regulation for the UK. This is despite the fact that the UK is subject to relatively stringent environmental regulations which are strongly enforced, 2 whilst also being one of the major outward investors of the world economy. In fact, the UK was the second largest outward investor in 2007, with a stock of FDI out ‡ows that exceeded $1.7 trillion (UN, 2008).
From the analysis we …nd that, controlling for …rm performance, environmental regulations are not a robustly signi…cant determinant of the internationalisation decision made by a …rm. On the other-hand, there is strong evidence to suggest that if it is costly for the multinational enterprise (MNE) to comply with stringent environmental regulations, its location decision will be a¤ected by the environmental regime in place in the host country. Any e¤ect is however highly conditional upon other factors, notably how corrupt the host country is. Relaxing environmental regulations in an uncorrupt country has a signi…cantly positive e¤ect on the probability a MNE locates there, but there is no e¤ect if the country is highly corrupt. In contrast to many previous studies, we establish results that are highly robust across a variety of di¤erent model speci…cations and estimation techniques.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the simple econometric framework employed. Section 3 then presents our data, focusing in particular on the environmental variables. In section 4 we present and discuss our results and perform a range of robustness checks.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
Econometric Methodology
If the pollution haven e¤ect from UK environmental regulation is an important determinant of the internationalisation decision made by …rms we would anticipate that, controlling for all other …rm and industry characteristics, UK …rms in industries with high environmental compliance costs would be more likely to own a¢ liates abroad than those in industries with low environmental compliance costs. This is tested in this paper using a Probit regression equation of the following form:
for …rm i in industry j. Subsidiary is a binary variable which takes a value of 1 if the …rm has one or more foreign subsidiaries and 0 if it does not. EnvironmentalCosts is a measure of environmental compliance costs in industry j. A positive and signi…cant value for 1 would indeed suggest that UK …rms in industries for which it is costly to comply with the environmental regulations are more likely to be MNEs. Mindful of the possible correlation between our measure of environmental costs and other factors that in ‡uence the domestic return to investment (relative to abroad) within an industry we also include other industry factors thought to be important in determining outward FDI decisions, namely measures of the physical capital intensity, human capital intensity, and technological intensity (R&D expenditure). These are included in the vector Y . Caves (1982) , Helpman (1984) and Brainard (1993) emphasise the importance of factor proportions to explaining the pattern of foreign direct investment.
In addition, previous studies using U.S. data have shown that pollution intensive sectors, which will have high environmental compliance costs, are also generally physical capital intensive (e.g. manufacturing UK industries and pollution intensity. They suggest this could be because skilled labour is required to maintain complex industrial processes, which often generate more pollution. We also include R&D because its importance to FDI is stressed by the intangible asset theory of foreign investment (as developed by Horstmann and Markusen, 1989) .
We control for di¤erences in the characteristics of …rms within the vector X. Multinational …rms have been consistently found to have superior performance characteristics compared to non-exporters (Helpman et al., 2004) . We would therefore anticipate that the better …rms within an industry are more likely to be multinationals. As speci…ed above, equation (1) assumes that all …rms in the sample are a¤ected in the same way by EnvironmentalCosts and the control variables. However, we expect the coe¢ cients to vary over the sample. For example, a relatively unproductive …rm might not become a MNE regardless of the extent stringent UK environmental regulations increase that industry's costs. On the other-hand, highly productive …rms may be signi…cantly a¤ected. We therefore introduce interaction terms to account for such possible …rm behaviour. Finally " is an error term.
A second component of the pollution haven hypothesis is where …rms choose to locate. The stringency of the environmental regulations in the destination countries is an important element of the pollution haven hypothesis. Even if regression (1) reveals that …rms in industries with high environmental costs are more likely to become MNEs, it could be that these …rms are locating their subsidiaries in countries with equally or more stringent environmental regulations than the UK. This would suggest other country factors are more important in the location decision.
We consider the factors that determine where UK MNEs locate their foreign subsidiaries by estimating a Probit estimation of the form:
for …rm i and country m. SubsidiaryLocation takes a value of 1 if the MNE has one or more subsidiaries in a given destination country and 0 otherwise. Hence for each MNE we now have one observation for 5 every country included in the dataset. This gives a total of i m observations. X as before is a vector of …rm-level control variables. Here we anticipate that even amongst multinational …rms, those with better performance characteristics are more likely to operate subsidiaries in more locations. As the pollution haven hypothesis does not provide de…nite predictions regarding the e¤ect an industry's environmental costs has on the probability that a MNE in that industry will locate in a given country, we control for any industry wide factors using Industry which is a vector of time invariant (two-digit) industry e¤ects. EnvironmentalReg is the stringency of environmental regulation in the destination country m.
M ediumCosts is a dummy variable for …rms in medium environmental cost industries, and HighCosts is a dummy variable for …rms in high environmental cost industries. Finally, Z is a vector of country-level controls.
Equation (2) 
Data
The primary source of the …rm-level data is the FAME (Financial Analysis Made Easy) dataset, published 
Environmental variables
To estimate regression equations (1) and (2) we wish to …nd a measure of the costs that …rms must undertake to meet the requirements of the environmental legislation (EnvironmentalCosts). We follow the approach established by the existing literature by using pollution abatement costs (scaled by value added) as a measure of environmental compliance costs. The PACE data have been published at the six-digit NAICS level (equivalent to four-digit SIC). 5 This data makes clear that there is a large spread in abatement costs within many …ve-digit NAICS industries, let alone the three-digit NAICS (which is equivalent to the two-digit SIC).
Although pollution abatement costs have become a widely used measure of the EnvironmentalCosts variable, there are criticisms of this approach. Firstly, using a single measure of abatement costs for all …rms within a particular industry overlooks the fact that in the UK the stringency of environmental regulation is determined to some extent at the local level. In the case of the UK, Cole et al. (2005) explain how this is the result of informal as well as formal regulation. Therefore although a …rm may be in a particularly dirty industry, if it is also located in a region with relatively lax environmental regulations, it could have far lower abatement costs than the industry average. One potential method for overcoming this caveat is to adjust the industry level measure of abatement costs according to the region in which the …rm is located, and how stringent environmental regulations are in that region. Unfortunately, data
are not available to allow us to weight the EnvironmentalCosts variable in this way and we must accept we therefore capture an industry average e¤ect, although it is only likely to a¤ect the question of the decision to become a MNE (not the location of a¢ liates).
Secondly, if many plants with high environmental costs within a particular industry have already o¤-shored pollution intensive production this will tend to lower the measure of domestic pollution abatement expenditure for the industry. While the use of …rm-level FDI data might be seen to reduce the usual concern of endogeneity between abatement expenditure and industry FDI ‡ows, we remain concerned by this point. This again motivates us to establish the robustness of our …ndings to the use of abatement cost data from an earlier time period. If at this earlier time, fewer …rms have o¤shored their dirty production then the current stock of FDI is less likely to have a¤ected the environmental costs variable in that earlier year. In fact, using past pollution abatement cost data could overestimate the e¤ect of industry-level endogeneity. This is because abatement costs (scaled by value added) of dirty industries tended to be higher in the past relative to other industries not simply because they had not o¤shored their production, but also because they had not invested as much in newer and greener technologies. Thus if we …nd using this data that the results remain robust, we can be reasonably sure that the endogeneity of abatement expenditure is not a problem.
The earliest year in which the Environmental Protection Expenditure survey data are available for the UK is 2001. However, from Figure 1 we can see that large outward FDI ‡ows had already taken place by this time. Hence the same problem could remain for this data. We therefore focus on the sensitivity of our …ndings to U.S. PACE survey data for 1994.
For equation (2) available for a far wider range of countries than measures used in previous studies. In addition, unlike other qualitative measures, it accounts not only for the stringency of environmental regulation but also the extent to which it is being enforced.
A common criticism of such survey data is that it may exhibit a "perceptions bias", i.e. respondents in a given economy systematically provide overly optimistic or pessimistic responses. The Executive Opinion
Survey aims to minimise any such bias in three ways. Firstly, the raw data are subjected to rigorous quality control processes. Outliers are excluded, in particular answers which are clearly too positive or negative in their outlook. Secondly, the questions are worded in a way that encourages respondents to compare the situation in their economy against the best-performing economies in the world, rather than considering the absolute performance of their economy. Thirdly, companies are selected whose size and scope guarantee that their business executives are not only familiar with the current conditions in their country, but also have knowledge and experience of the global environment. Hence it is argued that they are well positioned to judge their economy's position relative to that prevailing in others. Every e¤ort is made to ensure that the sample of respondents is representative of the national business sector in each country. In order to achieve this, the World Economic Forum has established collaborative partnerships with a network of over 130 institutions around the world.
Control variables
We include …rm and industry characteristics in regression (1) 
Descriptive statistics
In total, there are 6,762 UK owned manufacturing …rms in the sample, 6 which includes 715 MNEs.
MNEs are therefore only a small proportion of the total number of …rms (10.6%). The two-digit UK pollution abatement cost data are available for all of these …rms. Only 5,130 …rms in our sample are located in industries in which U.S. pollution abatement cost data are available however, which includes 571 MNEs. Hence when testing the robustness of the results using the U.S. data, the sample size will fall. Regarding the U.S. data, in 2005 pollution abatement costs totalled $20.7 billion, which for the same industries compares to $24.7 billion in 1994 (2005 dollars). Hence there has been a substantial fall in pollution abatement costs over recent years. This is consistent with the possibility that …rms have been investing in green technologies, but it is also consistent with the possibility that by 2005 many dirty …rms had o¤shored their production, thereby lowering their domestic abatement cost expenditure. 6 Here UK ownership is de…ned in terms of the global ultimate owner being based in the UK.
Descriptive statistics for the EnvironmentalCosts and the …rm-level and industry-level control variables, are included in Table 1 Further descriptive statistics can be used to provide useful information regarding the relationship between EnvironmentalCosts and the FDI behaviour of …rms. Firstly, it should be noted that the mean EnvironmentalCosts for MNEs is 1.22% whilst for non-MNEs it is 1.16%. Hence MNEs spend fractionally more on pollution abatement operating costs, although the di¤erence is not signi…cant at the 5% signi…cance level (the t-statistic is 1.825). Secondly, we consider the distribution of MNEs across the industries with the highest and lowest pollution abatement costs. This is summarised by Table 2 . If there is a signi…cant pollution haven e¤ect in the UK, the dirty industry …rms are likely to have o¤shored their production and therefore a large proportion should have foreign subsidiaries. However, it is clear from Table 2 that MNEs represent a greater proportion of the total number of …rms in the cleanest industries (11.24%) than the dirtiest (9.53%). Hence the pollution haven e¤ect does not appear to be strong enough to dominate other factors in determining …rms'FDI decisions.
In the estimation of equation (2), we consider a sample of up to 109 developed and developing countries.
A full list of these countries is given in Table A1 in the Appendix. MNEs tend to locate their subsidiaries in a small number of locations. On average the total number of 715 MNEs have subsidiaries in only 3.6 7 Although environmental costs are observed at the industry level, Table 1 summarises each …rm's observed value for EnvironmentalCostsU K, and hence there are 6,762 observations. countries. In addition, subsidiaries are most commonly located in other OECD countries, with 96% of the 715 MNEs having at least one subsidiary located within an OECD member. In contrast, 76% have subsidiaries in non-OECD countries. Table 3 provides summary statistics of the country-level variables included in equation (2) . Note that due to missing data the inclusion of Education and/or the policy variables will lead to a fall in the number of countries included in the sample. their productivity level, which we capture using an interaction term between EnvironmentalCosts and LabourP roductivity.
As suspected, omitted industry speci…c factors have a strong bearing on the correlation between environmental costs and the decision to become a multinational. In regression (a) EnvironmentalCosts has a negative e¤ect on the probability of becoming a MNE, the opposite e¤ect to that predicted by the pollution haven hypothesis. This result alters in speci…cation (b), EnvironmentalCosts becomes insigni…cant, once we introduce other industry variables. We conclude from these results that if there is any evidence that environmental considerations are a signi…cant determinant of the outward FDI decision of UK …rms, it is not as predicted by the pollution haven hypothesis. This might occur because pollution abatement costs are too small a proportion of total costs to a¤ect a …rm's internationalisation decision. It might alternatively be argued that the pollution haven hypothesis re ‡ects to a larger extent a vertical rather than horizontal FDI motive. If for the UK host countries with substantially weaker environmental standards are geographically distant then the trade costs associated with locating stages of the production chain in these countries may be prohibitive. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that the most highly polluting industries are not very geographically mobile, or footloose (Ederington et al., 2005) . Hence a globalisation strategy designed purely to exploit lax environmental standards abroad may simply not be economically worthwhile for UK …rms in comparison to say, being located close to markets (Brainard, 1987) .
These conclusions are robust to treating the environmental costs variable as a threshold variable.
There is no evidence of a threshold level to the e¤ects of abatement costs in speci…cation (c). High or medium cost …rms do not behave di¤erently in this respect to low polluters, or to each other, for both sets of pollution abatement data. 8 In addition, speci…cation (d) suggests there is no evidence for our sample that the …rms'response to changes in EnvironmentalCosts of the industry is conditional upon the productivity of their labour. We …nd similar results if we interact EnvironmentalCosts with …rm size (not reported).
The control variables are highly signi…cant across the regressions. As expected larger …rms with higher R&D appears to be a complement, rather than a substitute, for becoming multinational. Finally, the ScaleEconomies variable has a negative and signi…cant relationship with outward FDI: a lower average market share within an industry increases the tendency to conduct FDI.
In the remaining regressions in Table 4 we test the robustness of these results to the use of U.S. pollution abatement cost data. As discussed, the U.S. data has the advantage that it is more disag-gregated. 9 The 1994 PACE data is of additional interest because the o¤shoring of dirty production by pollution intensive industry prior to 2005 may have a¤ected the distribution of abatement costs across industries. Nonetheless, we again …nd that the results are broadly unchanged. U SEnvironmentalCosts94 is now weakly signi…cant for speci…cations (f) and (g), although of the wrong sign. However, similar to before it becomes insigni…cant in speci…cation (h), and is also insigni…cant if we include the apparel sector …rms (again this is not reported to conserve space). The signi…cance of the control variables is also una¤ected. The only minor di¤erence is that the interaction term between LabourP roductivity and EnvironmentalCosts becomes weakly signi…cant, although again it has an unexpected negative relationship. We therefore conclude that the lack of support for the predictions of the pollution haven hypothesis is robust.
Environmental Regulations and the Location Decision of MNEs
We use Table 5 to report on a second aspect of the pollution haven hypothesis; where …rms that choose to become multinationals locate their a¢ liates. Model (a) is a simpli…ed version of equation industry dummies are all not reported to conserve space. 9 Using the 2005 PACE survey data we …nd no e¤ect on the conclusions drawn. These results are available from the authors on request.
1 0 Two further controls of the policy environment were also considered (macroeconomic stability and the extent of regulation of credit, labour and business). However, these variables were generally found to be insigni…cant, and at the same time introduced multicollinearity problems. Hence they are excluded from the analysis presented here. From regression (a) we …nd there is no evidence in favour of the pollution haven hypothesis. In fact,
conversely it appears as though countries with stringent environmental regulations are more likely to attract UK MNEs. However, this would appear to be a consequence of other important control variables omitted from the regression, in particular the policy control variables. If we introduce government size, protection o¤ered by the legal system, and openness to trade, we now …nd that EnvironmentalReg has a negative and signi…cant e¤ect on the probability of …rm location. Conditional on a range of other aspects of policy we …nd the …rst evidence that multinational …rms are attracted to locations that have lower environmental regulations.
With the further addition of the corruption variable in regression (c) the magnitude of the deterrent e¤ect from environmental regulation even increases. Hence it appears as though even with the inclusion of other policy variables, EnvironmentalReg to a large extent picks up the positive e¤ect of lower corruption. Corruption itself is found to deter UK foreign investment. From regression (d) we also …nd that the more corrupt the country, the less the deterrent e¤ect from stringent environmental regulations (Corruption EnvironmentalReg is positive and signi…cant). Again this would tend to support the pollution haven hypothesis. From speci…cation (e) there is a possibility that the direct e¤ect of corruption arises in part because it is acting as a proxy for human capital (Corruption becomes only weakly signi…cant), but both the direct and interaction e¤ects for EnvironmentalReg are robust.
For speci…cation (c), the predicted probabilities of establishing subsidiaries in a country range from 0.000 to 0.982 across the 68,640 …rm-country combinations, although the mean predicted probability is just 0.034 (or 3.4%). Hence for the vast majority of observations there is a low probability that the depen- When reporting the impact of environmental regulations in the host country on the predicted probability of a MNE locating there, one should emphasise however, that it is highly conditional upon the level of corruption. We can depict this using Figure 2 , which is based on the estimates of speci…cation (c). The diagram plots the variable EnvironmentalReg against the predicted probability of location for three di¤erent types of countries; a country with a corruption index equal to the lowest value in our sample (low corruption), the sample average (average corruption), and the highest value in our sample (high corruption). All other variables are held at their sample means. It is clear from the diagram that the predicted probability of …rm location is almost independent of environmental standards for highly corrupt countries, and even for countries with an average level of corruption. On the other-hand, the relative impact of environmental regulations for a country with a low level of corruption is substantial, with the probability of location more than ten times greater if EnvironmentalReg takes a value of 2 rather than 7. Focusing now on speci…cations (d) and (e), we …nd that …rms in high, medium and low environmental cost sectors are heterogeneous in their response to EnvironmentalReg. High cost sector …rms are more strongly deterred from establishing subsidiaries in a country with stringent environmental regulations than low and also medium cost …rms (for speci…cation (d) the null hypothesis that the coe¢ cients on M ediumCosts EnvironmentalReg and HighCosts EnvironmentalReg are equal gives a 2 statistic of 3.97, which is rejected at the 5% level). Hence the more costly it is to comply with UK environmental regulations, the more attractive countries with weak environmental regulations become. It is perhaps surprising to …nd that even for the low cost sector there is a statistically signi…cant deterrent e¤ect from EnvironmentalReg. However, it is arguably not economically signi…cant, and is not found to be robust in some speci…cations reported later, in which we estimate separate regressions for the high, medium and low cost sectors.
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A further robustness check is provided by Table A2 in the Appendix, which repeats the estimations reported by Table 7 using year 2000 country variables. Recall that Figure 1 suggests a large proportion of the MNEs in our sample may have made their decision to establish foreign subsidiaries in the late 1990s. Hence it might be more relevant to measure the country variables at this time, rather than in 2005. 13 However, in 2000 the Executive Opinion Survey had a smaller country coverage, and hence the regressions in Table A2 The estimation results given by Table A2 suggest that environmental regulations have a stronger role to play in determining the location in which UK MNEs establish foreign a¢ liates than previously estimated. For example, for speci…cation (c), a 1 unit increase in EnvironmentalReg now decreases the probability of location by 0.58%, evaluated at sample means. This marginal e¤ect is nearly three times that estimated by the corresponding regression in Table 5 . To put this into context, the average predicted probability of a MNE locating in a destination country is 5.5%, which is higher than before as there are fewer countries in which MNEs only very rarely establish subsidiaries. Furthermore, speci…cations (d) and (e) tell us that the threshold e¤ects of being a …rm in a medium or high environmental cost sector are also stronger than before. For instance, (e) tells us that increasing EnvironmentalReg by 1 unit reduces the probability that …rms in the high environmental cost sector establish foreign subsidiaries in that destination by 0.46% more than low cost sector …rms. The corresponding percentage in Table 5 was just 0.12%.
Overall, there is strong evidence that the impact of EnvironmentalReg on the location decision of a MNE varies according to environmental compliance costs. This may also apply to the control variables.
To further investigate heterogeneity in the behaviour of the …rms in this respect, Table 6 reports separate regressions for high, medium and low environmental cost sectors. There are also other advantages to separating the sample in this way. For instance, it is now possible to calculate the marginal e¤ects of changes in the right-hand side variables separately for each group of …rms. Table 6 reveals di¤erences in the behaviour of each group of …rms. For the high compliance cost sector, the bias from omitting corruption is particularly evident; EnvironmentalReg is insigni…cant for speci…cation (a) but signi…cant and negative at the 5% level for speci…cation (b). Moreover, in the case of the latter, the magnitude of the coe¢ cient is nearly double that estimated by the equivalent pooled regression (speci…cation (c) in Table 6 ). A 1 unit increase in the environmental index now reduces the probability that a MNE in a high environmental cost sector will establish subsidiaries in a country by 0.37% with corruption included. Although the deterrent e¤ect from environmental regulations is also signi…cant for the medium and the low cost sector for speci…cation (b), the magnitude of this e¤ect is lower than that for the high cost sector. For medium cost polluters, the marginal impact of a 1 unit increase in the environmental index reduces the probability of location by 0.26%, and for low polluters by just 0.10%. These marginal e¤ects imply that the probability of location compare to a mean predicted probability of 4.7%, 3.3% and 3.1% for high, medium and low environmental cost …rms, respectively.
The estimation results discussed suggest that …rms are less likely to locate subsidiaries in a country with stringent environmental regulations. Hence maintaining tough environmental standards may lead to a loss of jobs and production which would otherwise have been attracted to the country if environmental standards were weaker. In this respect, there is evidence of a pollution haven e¤ect. It implies that governments can use environmental regulations as a policy tool to attract or discourage pollution intensive FDI. However, this result does not necessarily imply that there are countries that have become pollution havens, because it is conditional upon many other country variables. For instance, UK MNEs in high (as well as medium and low) environmental cost sectors are attracted to countries which o¤er strong legal EnvironmentalReg and GDP percapita is 0.76, again signi…cant at the 1% level), and …rms in the high environmental cost sector tend to invest in such countries due to lower labour costs. In fact, for speci…cation (b), just a 1% fall in GDP percapita of an average country leads to a 0.31% rise in the chances of an average MNE in the high cost sector locating subsidiaries there. Arguably this is far more economically signi…cant than the impact of EnvironmentalReg. Hence developing countries might be more likely to become pollution havens to dirty industry because they have lower labour costs rather than because they have weak environmental regulations. For some this might be seen as semantics. Put simply, the results suggest that developing countries may become dirtier due to UK FDI, although principally in order to take advantage of lower production costs rather than weak environmental standards. Meanwhile, for low environmental compliance cost industry we …nd that GDP percapita is insigni…cant, despite the fact that clean …rms are often thought of as labour intensive (see for example Cole and Elliot, 2005) .
In contrast to GDP percapita, the measure of market size (GDP ) is a robustly signi…cant determinant of MNE location for the low environmental cost …rms, while it becomes insigni…cant for the high cost sector …rms once we introduce Corruption. This suggests that when low cost …rms locate abroad they do so with the aim of expanding into new markets, thereby strengthening their position in a global context. This possibility is supported by the result that low cost industry is more likely to locate subsidiaries in destination countries that are less open to free trade (Openness is negative and signi…cant). Hence low cost sector …rms are establishing subsidiaries in order to access closed markets which cannot be easily served by exporting. This is not the case for the high cost industry, for which Openness is insigni…cant.
Moreover, it is more globally engaged low cost sector …rms that are more likely to locate subsidiaries in a foreign country (i.e. they have a greater export share). In contrast, for high cost sector …rms
ExportShare is insigni…cant.
Other di¤erences between the low and high environmental cost sectors include that a smaller size of government in the destination country's economy attracts low cost sector …rms (GovernmentSize is positive and signi…cant). We interpret this result as showing that …rms in low cost sectors are attracted to countries with more market-friendly policy environments. That GovernmentSize is insigni…cant for high cost sector …rms for speci…cation (b) might therefore again indicate that they are more concerned with o¤shoring production rather than accessing new markets. Typically, in a CLM the individual makes only a single choice, assumed to be that which maximises utility. However, the nature of our dataset is such that a number of choices may be observed, i.e. MNEs often establish subsidiaries in more than one destination country. We therefore follow the location choice literature (for example, Becker et al., 2005) by assuming that the management of each MNE delegates the location decision to a number of decision makers who individually select a single location for investment out of the M alternative countries. Clearly these individual location decisions are likely to be correlated for each MNE. We therefore allow for clustering, such that observed location choices are assumed to be independent between MNEs, but not necessarily independent within an individual MNE's location decisions.
The CLM assumes that decisions regarding …rm i's location are driven by a stochastic utility function U im , where:
for countries m = 1; :::; M . Here, V im is the deterministic component of the utility that …rm i derives 1 4 As before, we test the robustness of the results reported in Table 6 to using country variables measured in the year 2000. As was the case for the pooled regression, we …nd that the magnitude of the e¤ect EnvironmentalReg has on the probability of MNE location increases using 2000 data. 1 5 An additional robustness check was also performed by introducing the measure of education in the destination country into speci…cation (b). The results are not reported due to reasons of space, but for high, medium and low environmental cost …rms this measure of human capital was found to be insigni…cant at the 10% level, and did notably a¤ect the estimation results.
when choosing to establish subsidiaries in country m, and " im is the random component. The general form of the utility function V im can be given as:
where z m contains values of the independent variables for country m, and contains the e¤ects of the country-speci…c variables. m is a country-speci…c …xed e¤ect. One approach to including …rm characteristics would be to create a characteristics variable which varies across countries. This would be achieved by de…ning a series of dummy variables d im = 1 if country = m, and 0 otherwise. A series of pseudo-attributes x im is then generated from the individual characteristics x i in the following way:
The set x i = fx im ; m = 2; :::; M g is then included, alongside the genuine attributes z m , in the utility speci…cation V im . x i1 is dropped to avoid collinearity. Hence in formula (3), x i contains the …rm-speci…c independent variables for …rm i, and m contains the coe¢ cients for the e¤ects on country m relative to the base country m = 1. Further details can be obtained in Long (1997) .
In the case of our sample, there are up to 109 countries included in the estimation equation. We therefore need 108 interaction terms for each of the …rm-level and industry-level variables. Clearly this would generate far too many explanatory variables. To simplify the model, we therefore group the destination countries into 10 regions; North America, Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Australasia, Africa, East Asia, South Asia, Central and South America, the Caribbean, and the Middle East. We then generate pseudo-attributes x ir for regions r = 1; :::; 10, rather than the M countries.
Hence we rede…ne the set x i = fx ir ; r = 2; :::; 10g, and include this in formula (3), which now takes the form:
such that r is now a region-speci…c …xed e¤ect, and r contains the coe¢ cients for the e¤ects of …rm characteristics x i on region r relative to the base region r = 1. In this way, the CLM allows us to judge how …rm characteristics in ‡uence the region the …rm decides to invest in, rather than the speci…c country within that region. Clearly, country characteristics are still included as determinants of the location choices made within regions.
It is assumed that the location choices y i 2 f1; :::; M g relate to stochastic utilities U im through an observability criterion which states that:
This leads to the following general expression for the probability Pr(y i = mjx i ; z i ) of the ith decision maker choosing country m:
To derive expressions for each Pr(y i = mjx i ; z i ), and consequently estimate the parameters of V im , it is assumed that each " im is distributed as an independent extreme value. In this case, McFadden (1974) showed that the predicted probability of a decision maker choosing to locate in country m is: The estimation results for the conditional Logit model are provided by Table 7 . Speci…cations (c) and (d) allow the impact of environmental regulations in the host country to vary according to the environmental compliance costs of the MNE's industry. As noted above, the …rm-level control variables (Employees, LabourP roductivity, Exporter and ExportShare) are included as interaction terms with dummy variables for 9 regions. The base (omitted) region is Western Europe. However, these interaction terms are not reported in Table 7 in order to conserve space. In addition, speci…cations (b), (c) and (d) include the industry control variables (P hysicalCapital, HumanCapital, R&D, ScaleEconomies),
again as a set of interaction terms, but again omitted to conserve space. Finally, all four speci…cations also include region-speci…c constant terms (again not reported).
The CLM provides evidence which is supportive of the conclusions derived from the Probit estimations.
EnvironmentalReg has a statistically signi…cant deterrent e¤ect across all four speci…cations, which regressions (c) and (d) suggest is stronger for MNEs in industries with higher environmental compliance costs. More speci…c interpretations can be provided by the odds ratios given in Table 7 . The odds ratio associated with EnvironmentalReg is 0.56 for both (a) and (b). This has the following interpretation:
increasing the environmental index by one unit for a given country decreases the odds that a MNE will establish subsidiaries there by 44%, holding the values for all other countries constant. This rises to 49% for both (a) and (b) if Education is added as a control variable to these regressions (not reported).
Compared to the interpretation of the marginal e¤ects provided by the Probit regressions based on the same data, the magnitude of this e¤ect appears to be far more economically signi…cant. However, it must be taken into account that this apparent large change in the odds only applies to a very small probability of location (the mean predicted probability of these models is around just 1%). Referring to speci…cation (c), the results tells us that if the logarithm of the environmental costs of an industry is 1 unit higher, MNEs in this industry are deterred from investing in a country by an additional 22% following a 1 unit rise in EnvironmentalReg. This rises to 26% for once we also control for Education (speci…cation (d)). it invests. This is consistent with the evidence from Table 4 regarding this aspect of the pollution haven hypothesis.
The interaction terms between
Conclusion
In this study we have examined whether environmental standards in ‡uence UK …rms' FDI behaviour.
We have found some robust support for some aspects of the pollution haven hypothesis. No evidence has been uncovered to suggest that …rms in industries with high environmental compliance costs are more likely to become MNEs, despite the possibility of taking advantage of environmental regulation that is relatively weak abroad compared to the UK. However, once the …rm has decided to become a MNE, there is evidence of a statistically signi…cant pollution haven e¤ect. That is, …rms are deterred from investing in potential host countries if they operate stringent environmental regulations, ceteris paribus.
This deterrent e¤ect is far stronger for …rms in higher environmental compliance cost sectors, although falls dramatically the greater the level of corruption in the host country. Moreover, the magnitude of the pollution haven e¤ect grows when we use year 2000 data, at which time many of the MNEs in our sample may have made their location decisions. This suggests that environmental regulations are indeed a useful policy tool to reduce the pollution intensity of UK FDI that a host country receives.
Although the estimation techniques used in this paper do overcome many caveats to previous empirical work, there are nonetheless further problems which might potentially remain. These include that we cannot control for unobservable plant …xed e¤ects. In addition, there may be unobservable country characteristics that are correlated with both environmental regulation and investment which would bias the results. Another problem is that the o¤shoring of production is in practice a dynamic phenomenon.
However, our …nding that the results are robust to using country variables from the year 2000 suggests that this problem may not necessarily a¤ect the conclusions drawn by this paper.
Appendix
Dependent variable SubsidiaryLocation :Presence indicator by country and …rm, which takes a value of 1 if the …rm has at least one foreign manufacturing a¢ liate in the respective host country.
Environmental variables
EnvironmentalCosts :Logarithm of pollution abatement operating costs (PAOCs) per unit of value added. This is taken from the UK Environmental Protection Expenditure survey, with value added data from the OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database. The survey de…nes PAOCs as all in-house expenditure in 2005 associated with the operation of pollution control abatement equipment and payments to external organisations for environmental services. This includes labour costs, leasing payments and maintenance costs for equipment and payments made to others for the treatment and disposal of waste. Environmental spending also does not include spending on health and safety. It does not include any spending where the primary purpose is other than environmental protection.
The data are based on a strati…ed random sample of 7,858 companies, drawn from the Inter Departmental Business Register (IDBR) held by the O¢ ce for National Statistics (ONS). Companies with 1 to 9 employees were excluded. The total number of validated responses was 1,466. By taking the ratio of PAOCs to value added, the data accounts for industry size. PAOCs are measured at (approximately) the two-digit SIC level. 
